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Refugees in Southern Africa* 
Destabilization and Refuges in Southern Africa 
by Diana Cammack 
'When there is war you don't have time to 
plough. You are naming here and there, in the 
mountains, under the rocks and so forth". This 
was the lesson learned by thousands of 
Zimbabweans during their war of independence 
and is the lesson being learned al l  across the 
subcontinent today by millions of people. 
victims of P.W. Botha's war of destabilization. 
South Africa -- incapable of fighting a 
convention war on all fronts -- began in the late 
1970s. after P.W. Botha's election. to devise 
other ways of obtaining its regional goals. The 
result can be labelled "low intensity" or 
"proxy" warfare, or, in other words, 
destabilization. The situation in southern 
Africa fits the deftnition of destabilization put 
forward by Bjom Heme in Developmmt Md 
Peace in the Spring of 1985: destabilization is 
"all kinds of efforts on the part of a powerful 
actor, short of open warfare and invasion, to 
weaken and eliminate another actor that for 
ideological, military-strategic, economic and 
political reasons is unacceptable, even if not 
constituting a real direct threat in any other way 
than providing a dangerous example or model 
that could be followed by others." This 
definition includes clandestine and indirect 
military activities, as well as activities in the 
economic, political and cultural field. 
South Africa's policy of destabilization has as 
its goal the continued domination of the region 
by the white population of South Africa. It is. 
in effect. the culmination of the colonial era 
and an attempt to halt the decolonization 
process: This has both economic and political 
implications. It means, for instance, ensuring 
the maintenance of economic domination estab- 
lished in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
-- in terms of transport network, trade patterns. 
ownership structures and labour recruitment. It 
also means the continued political domination 
by whites by making sure that the African 
National Congress of South Africa (ANC). 
which is orchestrating the struggle against 
apartheid, is given no shelter. logistical support 
or bases in neighbouring states. 
* 'Ihe author of the next two artides wishes to 
thank the staff of the Southern African Research and 
Doauncnution Centre, Harare. Zimbabwe. for 
usistmce provided. 
South f i c a ' s  aggressive policy is also meant 
to undermine the initiatives of the regional 
grouping of nine independent states -- the 
Southern African Development Co-ordination 
Conference (SADCC) -- so as to make it more 
difficult for its member states (Zimbabwe, 
Tanzania, Botswana, Lesotho. Swaziland. 
Angola, Mozambique and Malawi) to gain their 
economic independence and therefore be in a 
position to advocate sanctions. 
Destabilization takes several forms: the 
destruction of economic infrastructure, such as 
blowing fuel depots, pipelines, and electricity 
pylons; disrupting transport by destroying 
bridges, roads. rail lines, locomotives, buses 
and trucks. The psychological and social well- 
being of both local and refugee populations are 
severely disturbed by raids carried out against 
neighbouring states by the South Afiican 
Defence Force. 
Sunogate dissident forces are given training, 
arms and logistical support by South Africa; 
they have been active in five neighbouring 
states: UNlTA in Angola, "Super Zapu" in 
Zimbabwe, the Lesotho Liberation Army, the 
Mozambique Resistance Movement (MNR) and 
the r m t s  of the Mushala gang in Zambia. 
The targets of these dissidents include political 
leaders, government facilities, and projects 
funded by international donors and staffed by 
expatriate workers. Sometimes. as in 
Zimbabwe, white farmers and tourists are 
targets because their deaths create international 
news. In Mozambique and Angola the 
peasantry which supports their respective 
govemments are the main targets of the MNR 
"armos bandidos". 
Since 1978 there have been five different phases 
of South African destabilization. The fmt ran 
from 1978 to mid-1980 and included attempts 
by Pretoria to undermine the political and 
economic independence of neighbouring 
countries through the promotion of South 
Africa's "Constellation of States". A second 
phase. from mid-1980 until the end of 1981. 
was more aggressive, with South African 
sponsorship of dissident groups increasing, as 
were terrorist activities of South Afiican 
commandos. The war in Angola was reopened 
and attempts to undermine the economic 
infrastructure which links Zimbabwe through 
Mozambique to the outside world were made. 
More selectivity of targets was evident in the 
third phase, indicating that Pretoria had begun 
to differentiate between its neighbours and to 
fine-tune its policy. The conservative states of 
Swaziland and Malawi. potential collaborators, 
were offered incentives (land and loans) to con- 
form to Retoria's dictates, while Mozambique 
and Angola came under more ruthless attack. 
In Lesotho, where Chief Leabua Jonathon took 
an increasingly hard l i e  against Pretoria, the 
capital city was raided and forty-two people 
were killed, twelve of whom were locals. 
In early 1984 President Samora Machel of 
Mozambique signed t h e h m a t i  Accord with 
South Africa, thus initiating a fourth phase. 
TheembattledMozambican government decided 
that after two decades of war and seven years of 
bad weather it needed peace in order to gain the 
breathing-space necessary to regenerate its 
economy. A period of "Pax Pretoria" followed, 
with the Angolans and South Africans also 
signing a ceasefire agreement and a previously 
negotiated non-aggression pact between 
Swaziland and South Africa made public. 
On the surface. then, the signing of the 
Nkomati Accord marked the beginning of a 
period of regional peace and co-operation. But 
evidence subsequently brought to light 
conf i i s  the view expressed by many a cynic at 
the time of the signing: Pretoria will never 
abide by the Nkomati Accord. 
While Machel expelled members of the ANC 
from Maputo as promised in the Accord, South 
Africans extended the MNR's airsmp inside 
Mozambique. They continued to provide the 
"bandits" with communications equipment. 
medical supplies and arms. MNR leaders were 
brought to South Africa by submarine, car and 
airplane. and on at least three different occasions 
the South African deputy minister of Foreign 
Affairs flew into MNR headquarters inside 
Mozambique for talks with its leaders. A new 
transmission network for the MNR was set up 
by the South Africans, and a South African 
team went into the central province of 
Zambezia to train recruits. Also, some of the 
MNR were shifted from their bases inside 
South Africa's Transvaal province to Malawi to 
"take the heat off South Africa" and to enable 
the "bandits" to step up activity in the 
productive regions of northern and central 
Mozambique. 
The fifth phase of destabilization began late in 
1984, not coincidentally about the same time 
Ronald Reagan was re-elected to the presidency 
of the Unitcd States. New incursions of 
"Super ZAPU" were recorded in Zimbabwe's 
southwest provinces, and the LLA, which has 
been inactive for months, re-emerged. The 
fqade of "goodneighbourliness". which charac- 
tcrized the earlier phase, suffered a fatal blow 
when Captain Wynand Du T o i ~  a South 
African commando, was captured by the Ango- 
lans in Cabinda, where he and his men had been 
on a mission to destroy an oil storage complex. 
Once more refugees became a target of Pretoria 
when in June 1984 the SADF raided the 
Botswana capital and killed a doten civilians. 
Meanwhile, Botha continued to press 
neighbowing states to sign agreements such as 
the Nkomati Accord or the Swaziland 
agreement. If he had had his way, the whole 
region would have expelled South African 
refugees and have allowed the South African 
m y  to patrol areas where the ANC were 
suspected to pass. The leaden on the Frontline 
refused to comply and in May 1986 the South 
African air force and SADF commandos raided 
t b  capitals -- Harare, Lusaka and Gaborone 
-- where homes and offices were destroyed and 
civilians killed. The target in Lusaka was the 
UNHCR-supported &ansit centre at Makeni, 
where eighty-six people were housed. While no 
one at the centre was killed by the cluster 
bombs or machine gun fie. a house some 300 
metres away was damaged, killing two people 
(a Zambii  and a Namibian) and injuring ten 
ohen. 
The situation continued to deteriorate and in 
mid-Oaobcr 1986 there were widespread 
warnings that South Africa was intent upon 
killing Samora Machel. On October 19th his 
plane was drawn off course by a bogus beacon 
and crash-landed ineastern South Africanear the 
Mozambican border, killing Machel and several 
of his close aids. Questions regarding South 
Africa's and the MNR's role remain, though 
South Africa has refused to continue with the 
international enquiry. Machel had been on his 
way home from one of several meetings with 
leaders in southern Africa, meetings aimed at 
reopening the Benguela railway line rhrough 
Zaire and Angola to the sea and halting 
Malawian support for MNR bandits operating 
From that country. In December an agreement 
was reached betwccn Mozambique and Malawi; 
since then, Malawi's support for the "bandits" 
has declined, and joint Mozambican-Tanzanian- 
Zimbabwean army operations in the northern 
and central provinces have begun to re-take 
MNR-controlled areas. 
The cost of Botha's destabilization of SADCC 
states was upwards of US $10 billion for the 
years 1980-84. This amount exceeded that 
granted in foreign aid and loans to all nine 
SADCC states in the same period According 
to the January 1987 report for UNICEF. 
"Children on the Front Lie", another US $15 
billion in war damage, output losses, additional 
defence expenditures. and lost ecanornic growth, 
was added to the total in 1985-86. The total 
amount -- now upwards of US $25 billion -- is 
equivalent to the region's produdon in 1975. 
Put another way, the 1980-86 cost of desta- 
bilization is of the same order of magnitude as 
a whole year's production in the &on 
The human cost is alro staggering. 
Throughout the region peasant communities 
suffer as South African-backed dissidents sweep 
through areas. burning, raping. looting. 
murdering. and maiming suspected government 
supporters. In northern N m i i  and southern 
Angola there is a full-scale war d descriptions 
of l i e  there tell the tale. 
Allister Sparks recently to& Angola and 
reported that in this war there are "few set 
pieces". Instead. it is a "hit-andnm affair that 
rages in farming villages and on peasant 
allotments". In the highlan&, he explained, 
landmines are planted in fields and along 
footpaths. The result: last year there were at 
least 10.000 people mutilated. The Red Cross 
factory in Huambo manufactures limbs at the 
rate of sixty per week but is "still failing to 
keep pace with the highest percapita rate of 
amputees in the world. In Angola there are at 
least 600,000 people displaced by war and 
dependent on assistance for survival. With an 
infant mortality rate of between 325 and 375 
per 1.000. Angola ranks with AFghruuJtan (and 
Mozambique) as having the worst child 
mortality rate in the world. UMCEF estimated 
that in 1985, some 55,000 Angolan children 
under the age of five died because of war and 
destabilization. 
In Namibia, one Angolan told his story to 
another reporter: 'The South African soldiers 
forced us here. They say we w m  giving food 
to SWAP0 (Namibian liberation forces) and 
they burnt our kraals and corn and threatened to 
kill us unless we moved to Ovamboland 
(northern Namibia). Later on UNITA came 
along and drove away our cattle." Another 
reporter wrote of northem Namibia in late 
1985: "We drove . . . through a landscape that 
bore the scars of full-scale war. The 
countryside had been defoliated and depopulated 
by the . . . SADF . . . about a  yea^ ago in an 
effort to ''pacify" the area. Only scattered 
remains of peasant communities were left. The 
South Africans have methods of dealing with 
rural inhabitants who refuse to leave 
voluntarily. Fist they destroy a village's water 
pump, a lifeline in Namibia's often arid 
climate, giving villagers the choice of leaving 
or dying. As a last resort. there is a crude but 
effective technique of levelling the entire m a  
with bulldozers." 
The result of South Africa's regional aggression 
is that there are some 70,000 Namibians and 
9.000 South Africans in Angola. There are 
nearly 20,000 South Africans in Swaziland, 
Lesotho and Botswana In Lesotho and 
Swaziland political refugees are encouraged to 
move on as the security situation in both 
countries is unstable. Recently, for instance, 
South African refugees were abducted &om 
Zwnziland by South African agents and taken 
back across the border. In Zambia there are 
over 120.000 refugees, about 90,000 of whom 
are Angolans fleeing from the war there. There 
are some 3.000 South Africans but according to 
the UNHCR only four to five hundred of these 
are affiliated with the ANC. There are also in 
Zambia some 10.000 Zairians. 5.000 Nami- 
bians and upwards of 20.000 Mozambicans. 
The vast majority of the refugee population 
in Zambia is self-settled in Zambian 
villages, where problems of food supply and 
malnutrition are already rife. 
Zimbabwe is refuge for at least 60,000 
Mozambican refugees and has a population of a 
few hundred South Africans. In Botswana there 
are about 4,500 refugees, most in Dukwe 
camp. Three quarters of these are From 
Zimbabwe. many from the southwestern 
provinces of Zimbabwe where the government 
has taken stern action against dissidents. In the 
last year negotiations between the governments 
of Botswana and Zimbabwe had led to the 
voluntary repatriation of several hundred 
Zimbabweans, and more should follow. 
There is an intimate relationship between 
apartheid. the State of Emergency in South 
Africa. acts of destabilization and the generation 
of refugees. In an effort to retain power over a 
black majority population and influence over 
the political and economic affairs of the region, 
the white-minority regime has s a k  out a1 
both its own people and its neighbours 
Cloaked in the rhetoric of a struggle against z 
total onslaught of communists and their Afri- 
can agents. Pretoria's policy is to destroy an) 
individuals or society which supports simple 
democracy in South Africa. It is expected b) 
residents on the Frontline that the white regirnc 
will continue to resort to desperate acts to stq 
in power. Dr. Chiem Minister of Foreigr 
Affairs in Botswana, put it most eloquently 
'The whole source of tension is apartheic 
policy [and] . . . until apartheid is diimantlec 
lock. stock and barrel. the confusion which thi: 
vile system generates inside South Africa wil 
continue to spill over across the borders am 
threaten the peace and stability of the region." 
The Displaced People of Mozambique 
by Diana Cammack 
Mozambican "displaced persons" meet to disc 
The crisis in Mozambique which has recently 
captured the world's atention is the result of a 
number of factors, some of long duration. 
Mozambique, a country abouth half again as 
big as California with a population of about 
fourteen million and a GNP per capita (1984) 
of US $210, was left by its Portuguese masters 
with only US $1 million in foreign reserves 
and gold an annual GNP per capita of not 
much more than US $100 and a population 
with an. illiteracy rate approaching 98% and 
largely unskilled. All but 15.000 colonialists 
fled, many to South Afiica, and in their 
bitterness they destroyed and paralyzed 
machinery. As they left they often simply 
removed a vital mechanical  par^ other times 
they destroyed repair manuals and business 
records in an effort to sabotage the Mozambican 
economy. 
Mozambique tried to man its important 
industries and service sectors with local 
"dynamizing groups" and in the mid-19705 it 
was not uncommon to find people with only 
elementary school education running whole 
provincial health programmes or serving as 
bookkeepers for factories. In an effort to raise 
food production levels quickly by building 
*uss shortages, 1986. l l ~ ~ m  M~-AM wo 
upon the abandoned plantations, the 
government decided to create and fund state 
farms. The peasant farming sector, on the 
other hand, was ignored. 
Scarce foreign exchange was spent on 
importing large farm equipmenf but the 
expertise necessary to run such farms was 
missing. Hence, yields necessary to make the 
projects cost-effective were not realized. Not 
only were state farms expensive, but they also 
diverted scarce resources away from other 
sectors of the economy. Consumer goods were 
not produced and so the peasantry, without such 
items as bicycles, radios, cloth or processed 
foods to buy, were unwilling to produce for the 
market. When they did generate a surplus, 
much of it was bartered directly for food and 
other scarce items. In this way, much of 
Mozambique's excess production crossed into 
Zimbabwe and Malawi whcre items were 
available for purchase. 
By 1983 the government had realized its 
mistake. Since then it has tried to boost 
peasant production by making inputs more 
available and by increasing production of 
consumer goods. Currently the government is 
negotiating loans with the World Bank and the 
IMF'which will be used specifically to foster 
peasant production 
But it is two other factors which have seriously 
worsened Mozambique's already difficult 
situation. One is drought and the other is war. 
Rainfall in Mozambique, as elsewere on the 
continent. has been abnormal since 1977, with 
years of flooding (such as 1978) and of serious 
drought, such as 1981-84, continuing in some 
places into 1987. 
Drought victims began leaving in 1981, but it 
was not until 1983 that masses of displaced 
people began entering neighbouring states. 
They came by the thousands. arriving with 
dysentry. cholera, typhoid. malaria, bilharzia, 
leprosy and a host of other diseases. The 
journey through the dry bush was often fatal. 
A Zimbabwean aid worker said of the 
Mozambicans: 
Some said they left their children on the way. dying 
of hunger and thirst. . . They could carry them, but 
they didn't have anything to give them. So the 
children died in their arms. [Then] they just [went] 
near the river [bed] where there is this sand that is 
thrown off by the rain. So they just do this with 
their hands [indicating a digging position] and they 
bury their children there then go away. And when a 
baby dies on a dry plaa where there is no river, the 
mother just goes behind a tree and puu the child 
down. 
In Zimbabwe these people found shelter under 
trees, around mission hospitals, at bus stations. 
on farms and along roads. Initially they were 
fed by local communities and indigenous aid 
agencies. The food situation in Zimbabwe 
itself was already critical due to the drought, 
but still the government felt it had a duty to 
help the people who had sheltered 
Zimbabweans during their war against Ian 
Smith. By mid-1984 the government decided 
to move the people into government-run and 
internationally assisted camps. Today there are 
four camps in Zimbabwe and discussions are 
underway about a fifth. These shelter some 
30,000 people, though at least that many live 
outside, on farms, in the bush, villages and 
towns of Zimbabwe. 
Had the Mozambicans only to contend with the 
drought, it is likely that they, like others in 
simiiar circumstances in Africa, could have 
done so with the assistance of outside aid. But 
the Mozambican situation is seriouly 
complicated by war. This is the result of 
South Africa's rcgional policy, implemented by 
the MNR. 
The MNR (also known as "Renamo" or "annos 
bandidos"). was created in the mid-1970s by the 
Rhodesians in an effort to combat the liberation 
forces of the now-ruling party in Zimbabwe. 
who had their rear base in Mozambique. It 
originated when the Rhodesians, with the 
approval of the Portuguese. brought together 
several reactionary elements. In 1978. 
following orders from Salisbury. it set up bases 
deep inside Mozambique and began to attack the 
country's infrastnrcture of roads and bridges as 
well as its railway. 
By 1980, when Zimbabwe achieved 
independence, the Mozambican army had routed 
the bulk of the MNR. What saved it from 
collapse was the transfer of responsibility for it 
h m  Rhodesia to South Africa. Planes were 
sent to pick up personnel and equipment, which 
were femed to a new base in the Transvaal. Its 
new orders were basically the same: to attack 
the Mozambican infrastructure so as to cripple 
the Zimbabwean economy by destroying its 
lifeline (the "Beira corridor"), through 
Mozambique to the sea. SADCC was also a 
target South Africa did not want to see the 
nine states gain emugh economic 
independem. especially transport and trade 
independence. to be able to s w i v e  sanctions 
against South Africa The MNR leadership 
sought to undermine the Maputo government, 
force it into a coalition where several key 
ministries and provincial posts were held by 
MNTR leaders and post-colonial legislation and 
policy decisions overturned. To undermine the 
Maputo government the population had to be 
alienated, the economy ruined and the will to 
fight destroyed. 
To accomplish this the MNR adopted a policy 
of destruction and fear. For instance, 
mutilation -- cutting off noses, ears and breasts 
of opponents -- became official policy and is 
still practiced to a large extent today. People 
are abducted from their villages to serve in 
bandit units as fighters, porten, fanners and 
prostitutes. There has never been a real attempt 
by the MNR to "win the hearts and minds" of 
the peasantry or to build an alternative socio- 
economic or political structure. The goal. 
instead, is to destroy. 
And destroy they have done. For instance, in 
1982 alone, nearly 500 schools were closed, 
tuning out nearly 100.000 students. One 
hundred health posts were destroyed along with 
140 villages. which affected over 100.000 
people. By the end of 1985. one quarter of 
Mozambique's health facilities had been ruined 
and 40% of the primary schools abandoned or 
destroyed, putting 20% of the pupils out of 
school. In 1982-83. some 900 m a l  stores 
were closed, which disrupted the supply of 
goods to over four million people. Between 
1980 and 1985 the national cattle h 4  half of 
which belongs to the peasantry. was redraced by 
40%. Special targets an health workers 
(hundreds have been killed or maimed). 
teachers, priests and psrty officials. Overseas 
~ 0 1 ~ r e e r ~  ( ~ o o p ~ a n ~ s )  dS0 Mgorted, as 
are their aid and development projects: between 
198 1 and March 1986 o v a  one hundred of these 
people have bem kidnapped, wounded, killed, 
or all three. The situation has continued to 
deteriorate since, especially in the central and 
northern provinces. 
Naturally the Mozambican m y  and the militia 
try to protect the people, but this sometimes 
has mixed results. A Canadian volunteer 
working in Mozambique explained that: ". . . 
what w a  happening in terms of the peasants 
was that in rural areas, the bandidos would be 
coming into the villages in the night, holding 
meetings and saying to the villagers: 'you have 
to stop being involved in any kind of strucwes 
attached to FRELIMO [the ruling party] and 
then we don't want to see you selling things. 
we don't want you going to health posts, or 
attending pmy meetings or things like that' and 
telling the villagers that 'if you stay in these 
villages [which are FREIJMO inspired] we are 
going to come in. bum them down and kill 
you. We want you to go and disperse 
yourselves in the bush, and live like you used 
to, before FRELIMO came'. But, said the 
coqperatue. what happens to these people is 
that when FRELIMO comes back into the area. 
FRELIMO would say: 'We want you to go 
back into the villages and if you go to work on 
your marhambar [plots], you go out and work 
only in the day. and at night, as far as we are 
concerned, people walking in the bush are 
bandits."' 
He then provided an example of a village in the 
north where the MNR came in, burnt down 
three or four huts, killed a half-dozen people 
and left. The rest of the villages fled into the 
bush Not long afterwards the army swept 
through the area. rounded up the people and put 
them back into the village and stationed a 
militia there to protect them. Things went 
well for several weeks and so the militia was 
removed and the bandits returned, killed a lot 
more people. burnt some more huts. and sent 
the people back into the bush. In a situation 
such as this, people are likely to leave in search 
of security. 
A Mozambican woman seeking refuge in South 
Africa explained why she had left: 'Ten 
Rmamo men came to our village and left with 
all our food At ~ g h t  five returned and locked 
forty of us in one building while they stole 
everything else in the settlement Later they 
hadcuffed our husbands and forced them to lie 
face down on the ground. They crushed their 
heads with mealie grinders while we and the 
children watched. Nineteen pmpk were killed. 
We were not allowed to bury our dead, but were 
told we must leave them to rot" 
It is a war such qs this that has forced an 
estimated quarter-million Mozambicans to flee 
into neighbouring states while nearly four 
million more remain, displaced and facing 
starvation. In Zimbabwe, the Mozambicans are 
welcomed, as they are in Zambia, where at least 
20,000 have joined the 90.000 Angolans. 
Mozambicans are less welcome in Swaziland, 
Malawi and South Africa 
The trip into South Africa is fraught with 
dangers. Many people must walk across 
Kruger National Park, a wild game park known 
for its predators. Near the border they face off 
mines and then an electrified fence. Skeletons 
litter the border and farmers on the South 
African side report hearing mines going off day 
and night 
Once inside the countxy they are cansidered 
illegal aliens and only when they reach one of 
the "homelands" are they safe. There -- in 
GazanLulu, Wgwane or KwaZulu -- they are 
provided with food, blankets and medical aid at 
reception centres. and land is allocated to them 
by local headmen. Lf caught outside the 
homelands they are liable to be repatriated: 
some 1,500 are sent back each month. Yet 
some 50.000 have managed to reach one of the 
homelands to be registered, while another 
20.000 await registration. An estimated 
150,000 others are living illegally outside the 
homelands (in the "white areas"), and because 
they are amsidered illegal work seekas. they 
can be repatriated when caught 
But not everyone arrested by the immigration 
squads is sent back. Some. like Sam Ngornane. 
' On Repatriation: Plus ga change, 
are taken to prison and Erom there sent to work 
on white farms. Sam Ngomane, for instance, 
was arrested in October 1983 and, after several 
days detention, was turned over to white 
farmers, for whom he worked for a year for an 
average salary of R 30 (about US $15) per 
month. 
Refugees who fmd their way to Swaziland are. 
upon arrival, screened to determine that they are 
political refugees and not just seeking work. 
About half are turned back. The r u t  are sent to 
Ndzevane. where today there are about 5,000 
Mozambicans. Naturally, some try to settle in 
villages with members of their extended family. 
but because the government is opposed to their 
integration into Swazi society, they are 
generally rounded up and sent to reception 
centres. Some others have found work and 
housing on the large sugar estates that dot 
Swaziland's countryside. 
The war shifted north in 1986 after the bulk of 
the MNR moved into Malawi and the MNR 
headquarters at Gorongoso were captured by a 
joint Mozambican-Zimbabwean army opera- 
tion This accounts for the decline in the 
number of refugees reaching Swaziland recently 
and the massive influx of Mozambicans into 
Malawi and Zambia. 
Permanent settlement of Mozambicans inside 
Malawi is discouraged by the government there. 
Already overcrowded and with one of the 
highest child malnutrition rates in the world. 
Malawi does not wish to play host to refugees 
created by a war which it has fostered by 
supporting the MNR. By the end of 1986 
some 200.000 Mozambicans had had to take 
refuge there. but most returned as soon as 
possible. complaining of inadequate food 
rations and high child mortality rates. 
While the situation facing Mozambicans in 
each of the neighbowing states is difficult, the 
millioni who remain and who have been 
displaced by the war face death, torture and 
starvation. Here crops are burnt or stolen, 
transport of goods and relief supplies disrupted, 
hospitals and orphanages poorly supplied. But 
the Mozambican, Zimbabwean and the 
Tanzanian armies are on the offensive. clearing 
areas of bandits. International aid agencies have 
begun a major relief effort and grain, abundant 
in Zimbabwe, is being purchased by 
intensional donors for delivery in 
Mozambique. Agricultural implements and 
inputs. along with fuel. clothes and household 
necessities are needed. But most of all, it is 
peace that is in short supply and until 
Mozambique gets this muchdeserved peace. 
refugees will continue to pour across the 
borders. 
plus c'est la meme chose 
by Barbara E. Harrell-Bond 
In October, I visited Uganda and spoke with 
Banyanvanda refugees who have been there 
since -1959. Uganda is considering offering 
citizenship to these people, and one of my 
interests was to ask people I met just how they 
might respond to such an offer. As one put it, 
"Even if I can never go home, why should I 
deprive my children and my grandchildren of 
their homeland. I will never become a 
Ugandan." While it may not be "pragmatic" or 
"practical", every refugee I know longs for all 
of those symbols which are bound up in the 
notion of home. 
It is interesting how strong is the tendency for 
Europeans to forget their own recent history. 
Today. however, there are not only differences 
in scale and locality, but also in the attitude of 
the wealthier host and donor nations. Then, 
countries outside of Europe were willing to 
receive large numbers of refugees, and vast 
amounts of capital were poured into Europe to 
promote its rapid recovery. Another, and very 
important, difference between post-war Europe 
and many refugee-producing parts of the world 
today, was that the promise of political 
stability encouraged investment and the 
rebuilding of Europe. 
Humanitarian refugee agencies often lament 
their own lack of a "institutional memory" and 
their tendency to re-invent the wheel each time 
they are called to respond to a new refugee 
crisis. It is only through the publication of in- 
dependent research that such a memory will be 
developed. It is through an analysis of past rnis- 
takes and successes that progress can be made. 
We believe that historians have an important 
role to play. As Howard Adelman has noted. 
" . . . historical research into past attempts to 
solve refugee problems is invaluable if 
mistakes are not to be repeated. In that sense, 
refugee research shares a kinship with the 
refugees themselves. For it operates. if it does 
so at all, with little sense of its own history. 
Milan Kundera, the famous Czech exile writer. 
. . . describes the function of forgating or 
repressing one's history. It allows the past to 
be invented and old solutions to be 'reinvented'. 
In all the invention and artifice, culture is 
destroyed. We live in a fabricated world, 
rootless in time and in space, floating in a 
dream world of fantasy and not reality." 
Let us think a bit more about the role of inde- 
pendent academic study of refugees and why up 
to now there has bcen no accountability for the 
work undertaken by the humanitarian commu- 
nity -- and, why the incredible resistance to inde- 
pendent research. During your meetings you 
will be talking about forced repatriation after 
the Second World War. You will be discussing 
events in which many of the actors are long 
dead if not forgotten. For your data you have re- 
lied upon interviews with survivors and upon ar- 
chives which contain materials which would 
not have been available to you at the time these 
events were taking place. You will be expo- 
sing actions and events which will reveal enor- 
mous injustices and breaches of basic human 
rights which happened some forty years ago. 
You will be seeing the results of actions which 
were designed to serve political "interests" 
rather than the needs of people. Some of these 
actions were taken by those who were called 
humanitarians as well as by the politicians. 
What if you had written your papers at the time 
these crimes against humanity were being 
committed? What were scholars doing at that 
time? What are they doing today? Very few 
people are aware that the same practices 
continue today. How many of you are aware 
that even while we talk in.this open forum 
about the pasL secret meetings are taking place 
at which much more ambitious plans are afoot 
to "solve" today's refugee problem? The 
strategy, once again, and which is already beiig 
implemented in Africa, is repatriation. It is 
called voluntary, but one of the incentives for 
people to agree to go home, is that ration cards 
have been taken away from the refugees. 
I believe that you will find that contemporary 
approaches to repatriation differ very little from 
the period you are studying at this conference 
which you have so bravely labelled "forced", 
not voluntary repatriation. The challenge I 
would like LO put to YOU as historians is to ask 
you to point your readers towards the 
contemporary situation and to make your 
findings accessible to aid practitioners in the 
field. Refugee research must be rooted in 
history. The historical material exists to 
provide those roots and your work during this 
conference will belie the claims that the 
material is lacking. Though no two refugee 
situations y e  comparable, there are lessons we 
can learn from the past. 
The above are acerpts from Barbara E. 
HsrreU-Bond's address. "Forcible Repat- 
riation: T k  Continuing Relevance of the 
Subject" which opened the Camdian-funded 
symposium "Forcible Repatriation After 
WWII" held the Oxford University 
.!?xarni~twn Schools, Oxford, England, March 
20-22,1987. 
How Many Refugees in Africa? 
Tunisia 
Official numbers of 
refugees in Africa: 
UNHCR, 1986 
N m  d y  k n w  how many peopie have been 
forcibly uprwred by p d i  instabilii and war, but 
the estim&ed numbers of refugees hasted by African 
counuies are shown on the map. These do not 
include the possibly a d d i t i d  thousands labelled 
"illig$ aliens" md hounded by unfriendly hosts. or 
the millions of people who have been uprooted 
whithin their own national boundaries by the same 
causes. Most alarming. the numben of uprooted 
people in Africa n incruring. 
Why Are There So Many 
Refugees in Africa? 
'Ihe majority of refuges in Afria are the result of 
the continuing struggle for sclfdacrmination and 
indcpendena. The effom of South Africa to 
d u u b i  thc saurhem African region are producing 
even more refugees. The opprusive policies of so 
many African governments and their m s e q u a t  
political instability which produce refugees are 
directly linked with thcir extreme poverty and 
economic dependence. ?he escalaum of arms sales 
to Afiica uucabPea dl of these problems. 
Who Assists These 
Refugees? 
Most -- at kprt 60% -- do not receive any h help 
from refuga assisunrr pmgmmmes. They live by 
dint of their o m  determination to m ~ v e ,  wih the 
help of their hosts who are o h  themselves 
derpen:tely poor. There are indigenous non- 
governmental agencies and religious bcdiu which do 
their but to mitigate the suffering of refuga. The 
host governments which give uylum to refugees b u r  
the gwtest economic burden for uristing h. by 
giving than access to savicu. providing hd, and 
by permitting the agents of L u u n r t i d  
humanitarian assisunce to utilize their mourru to 
help refugees. International h u m a n i h  assirume 
is paid for by a few governmaus (the US is the 
largut donor) md privaie contributors who ruppoa 
the work of thc office of the Uniced Nations High 
Canmissioner for Refugees and intanrticud 
voluntary agencies. As are refugee put it, Ti is a 
g r u t  c o n u r d i .  We are fed by &e same 
govcmments which make g n t t  profi~ from selling 
the urns which mde us dugees." 
What Are African 
Refu ees' Main f Prob ems? 
They are powerless. Decisions about their fate are 
talc- by governmew and inranational agenda 
without umssltion. Many thousands are highly 
skikd. yet usistana to refugeu in Africa is limited 
largely to helping them become d-sufficient in 
agriculture. In addition to rhe psychological 
sufferings usxiwed with the trauma of being 
upootcd and the in~a r r i ty  associated with thew 
sums, they share dl the other proMems of grindiig 
pwerry which affect the majority of the members of 
the host society. Money for assisting refuges is nu 
even-hmdedly available for dl. Ruher the amount of 
humanitarian assistance is heavily influmced by the 
p d i c a l  m m t s  of the "dub" of donon which 
R1ppon refugee a g ~ ~ ~ i u .  
What Are the Solutions to 
the Refugee Problem? 
'Ihe prevention of forced migration requires political 
will and radical changes in the world of eamanic 
order. The "solutions" which the UN High 
Commiusioner promotes are voluntary repatriation. 
integration in the counuy of f i  asylum, and 
- a l a m t  in a third camtry. Neither refuges nor 
most governments in Africa are enthusiastic about 
the idea of in&egntion u a pernunmt solution. 
Europe and North America. which had a tradition of 
welcoming refugees, m fast closing their doon to 
people who seek asylum. At the manmt. the 
gmtest emphasis is on repatriation. but refugees are 
unwilling to mum home until the political 
conditions in their CQUN~~U have changed and 
security can be guaranteed. 
Why Is So Little Known 
about Some African 
Refugees? 
'Ihc foreign policy interests of the donor governments 
have a enormous influence on the extent of 
information available about refugees everywhere. 
lhia is nowhere morr. m e  than an the African 
continent Few people in the Wut know much 
about thc S h w i  refugees in Algeria. Why? 
&cause their war for self-determination is being 
fought against Morocco. When Ugandans we& 
fleeing Obcce's regime in 1982-83, information about 
&is &agency &s actively supprusd Refugeu 
uc urudly louted in areas which are the most 
inaccusible. Funhermore vnnrpoa and 
canmunicatiar to there areas is often controlled by 
i n t c m d o d  agencies. Aademics have negleaed 
studying refugee issues. and when they do, they ofm 
fail to disseminate information to the general public 
Refugee Policy Legislation, May 5, 1987 
On May 5, 1987. the Minister of Employment 
and Immigration and the Minister of State 
(Immigration) presented a bill to Parliament to 
establish a new set of procedures for refugee 
determination in Canada. The following are the 
highlights of the Bill: 
1 Initial hearing: Every arrival in Canada 
who claims to be a refugee will be seen 
within a few days by a panel of two 
people: one, a member of a newly created 
Refugee Board; the other. an immigration 
adjudicator to listen to the (oral) claim. 
la The main function of this hearing is to 
screen out several types of claimants. The 
following types will be rejected: 
la Those who arrived from a "safe rhird 
country" (as determined by the Cabinet) 
who had a reasonable opportunity to lodge 
a claim there. 
la2 Those judged to have "no arguable basis 
for their claims" would be returned. 
la3 Those recognized as refugees of another 
=Quney. 
la Those who previously had been rejected as 
a refugee claimant except where the 
claimant has been out of Canada for more 
than 90 days. 
la5 Those who are already subject to ordm for 
removal from Canada. 
The above decisions require the unanimous 
decision of the bvo-member panel. 
The above negative decisions imply 
removal of the claimant within seventy- 
two hours. 
The+ is right of appeal of the (negative) 
decision if given leave by the Federal 
Court to make such a claim on points of 
law. 
If one or both members of the two-person 
panel decides that the claim is arguable. 
the claimant will be referred to the Refugee 
Board for an oral hearing. 
The oral hearing for the claimant will 
be in the presence of two members of the 
Board. 1f the claim is accepted by one or 
both Board members. the claimant is 
officially accepted and may apply for 
landing (the official status for all 
immigrants) in Canada. If both Board 
members decide negadvely, the claimant 
is deported. There is right of appeal of a 
negative decision if given leave by the 
Federal Court to make such a claim on 
points of law. Persons will be removed 
from Canada while their appeal to the 
Federal Court is being considered. They 
would be represented by legal counsel. 
If granted an appeal, the claim will either 
be accepted or rejected. Those accepted for 
landing will return to Canada at 
government expense. 
These steps represent three levels to ''protect the 
new refugee determination system against 
abuse". In contrast with the present system. 
only three steps, instead of a maximum of 
eight are available in the claim process. The 
system is designed to prevent claimants from 
prolonging their stay in Canada by exercising 
appeas- 
After initial examination, the Inter-Church 
Committeee for Refugees has severely criticized 
the legislative ~oposa l  on three grounds: 
Fmt inacccssibillty: The legislation "seeks 
ways to return (claimants) before a full 
evaluation can be made. Secondly. urn- 
independence of decision-makers: As a 
whole. the decision-makers are not specialized 
in Canada on refugee dewination or related 
international matters. They are part of an 
overall immigration control procedure. ~ h i ; d l ~ ,  
no meaningful appeal: The Federal Court 
is not an independent appeal body. Its role 
would be unworkable because leave must be 
granted for an appeal and only then on matters 
of legal procedure, not on the merits of the 
case. 
Citing a short-cutting of human rights practices 
and standards of justice in Canada, the 
Committee calls for the withdrawal of the 
legislation and its replacement with means to 
"uphold humanitarian tradition as a symbol of 
hope in a dark world". 
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CANADA'S PERIODICAL ON REFUGEES 
REFUGE 
C/O Refugee Documentation Project. York University 
4700 Keele Street, North York, Ontario M3J 1P3 
- A /  P0st.g. Paid in Toronto 
s.amd C k U  h i 1  R-1 No. 5512 
-pc#t.g.- 
The Refugee Studies Programme, 
Oxford University 
The Refugee Studia Rognmme was established in 
1982 at Quem EliYbeth House, Oxford University, 
out of the n d  for f m h  directions and practice. An 
A. and q rc scnu t ivu  from host governments. 
Thlopoh project design. training. raurch, public 
dsb.ter, publiatioirs and seminars, the RSP seeks to 
hclp bxt countria and d u g e n  break the prrrent 
A W r  objective of RSP is to stimulate the 
denqdapdmu d puJlel programmes in other pa- of 
I& world, in paniculu in unmtries hosting large 
popukionr of refugees. The Refugee Studies 
Ropnmme at Juba University in thc Sudan was 
utrbltrhed in 1985. Siilar initiatives have begun 
at chul.longkom University in Bangkok, the 
Univaity of Zambia. Makcrere University, Uganda 
and the Colegio de Mtxiw. The RSP is also a 
member of thc International Refugee Documentation 
Network. which aims to widen the availabiilhy of 
information md audemic literature in this fd. The 
Refugee Doanaenuion Project at Yo* University 
and the RSP have bcen in contact since 1982 and 
fonmlizcd their wllaboration in 1985 through the w 
sponsonhip d the hmatma& - .  rympaium. 
"Twentieth Ceatury Rdugees in Eumpc uui the 
Middle k t " .  Together with Lmd, Univasity, 
Swcden, they were the wfoundaf of ths Inter- 
Univenity Consottium for Refugee Research 
(ICRR), which was pined by the ,- for 
Migration Studies. The furt product of thc ICRR is 
the Directory of C m m  RUCOTC~, wtuC& will be 
updated d y .  The RSP actively aaunga links 
and co-openm with the qanjl aber  a n t n s  in , 
Europe and North Amerjca. wdr'iu the D e p m e n t  
of sociology. CuZeron University, wh& refugee 
resea& is being c o n d u d .  , 
An indepardent evaludon of the hb& of 
emergency aid policies was undauLsn by Batban E. 
Hunll-Bond in Imposing Aid: Emergency ksirtancc 
to R c f u g . ~  (Oxford Uniwrity Press. 1986). In a 
recent study f a  WFP in the bonier campa m 
Thailand. Josephine Reynell pin-pointed some 
disturbiig facts about security and the psychological 
abuse of childm. A study in Uganda was uodutakm 
in October for the EEC by the RSP jointly with a 
Ugandan rcademic Refugee Ism. a reries of 
worlring papas plblished in conjllncrion WW the 
British Refugee Council, is now in its third M i m e  
Since 1985 thhyone visiting fellows. both 
rcdanicr a d  piaaitioners (many refugeu), have 
been .archcd to the RSP, rrpumting twenty-one 
oaiodtics. Fellows have wxur to all the 
rrrcurcu of the University. a d  are expected to share 
ruurchandexpcrim~cmdtoprticipstcintheRSP 
saUiMnmdrped.l-. 
'Ibe RSP is canmirted to contributing to the 
rudution of d c t  Ihrough public debate, bringing 
togclhcr u many sides of r dispute as possiblc In 
the pan y u r  them hu a confamcc on the 
Westem S & p  u which both the Sahnwis and -' 
Mcroccmr prtiapated; mother. titled "Ihe D i a  
of Incompatible Riqities" concerned rcrettlcment 
policies in E- and mare recently a meeting was 
d e d  in coajunaion with the M i  East Cmtn  and 
Mediul Aid to Palestinians to dmw attenlion to the 
urgent siauriar in the refugee prmpr in Lebmoa. 
~ o s t  Ay ;;r*intemitional symposium was held 
in Afghanirun whicb brought tpthcr 189 d u g e u .  
scholur, government o w  from borh'Pakistm 
and Iran, rrpruautives of agencies working on the 
bordcn. and d u d s  fran within Afghanistan iuelf. 
A highlight in Autumn 1986 was a major speech by 
the UN High Cammissioner on the need f a  political 
will to d v e  today's refugee problem. 
CANADA'S PERIODICAL ON R E f  UCEES 
- REFUGE 
I c/o Refugee Docurnental~on Project. York Un~ws~ty  4700 Keele Street North York. Onlar~o M3J tP3 
I wish to become a friend of the Refugee Documentation Project for the 1987- 
1988 academic year. I understand that all friends receive Refuge as well as 
information on the research activities of the RDP. My cheque for $2 5 (or ) 
made payable to the Refugee Documentation Project is enclosed. 
I Name Organization 
Address 
City Province or State 
Country Postal Code 
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